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Since the days of Tocqueville, for-eign observers have seen Americaas both a pattern and a problem.
They still do, and in ways that illumi-
nate the way law deals with bioethical
issues both here and abroad. America
was long exceptional in having a written
constitution, in allowing its courts the
power of judicial review, and in letting
courts exercise that power to develop
and enforce principles of human rights.
Today, that pattern looks markedly less
exceptional. After the Second World
War, Germany and Japan were persuad-
ed to adopt constitutions that included
human rights provisions and that en-
dowed courts with the power to inter-
pret them. Since that time, a number of
other countries—Canada, for exam-
ple—have also moved closer to the
American constitutional pattern.
Many countries, however, have not
been content to borrow American con-
stitutional principles and practices.
Their courts have also asserted their au-
thority to develop and enforce princi-
ples of human rights in two other ways.
First, courts in many countries have as-
sumed jurisdiction over questions in-
volving those rights by virtue of their
duty to interpret treaties their countries
have signed. Second, and strikingly,
courts in many countries have come to
see themselves as joint participants in
the work of building an international
body of human rights law. As my col-
league Christopher McCrudden writes
in his fascinating study of this develop-
ment, “It is now commonplace for
courts in one jurisdiction to refer exten-
sively to the decision of other courts in
interpreting human-rights guarantees.”1
This is where America has come to
seem a problem to our foreign ob-
servers. For the United States has been
irritatingly reluctant to sign these
treaties, and American courts have been
irritatingly unwilling to consult the de-
cisions of foreign courts. Why?
The reasons are—obviously—vari-
ous. Foreign observers are not infre-
quently pleased to believe that Ameri-
cans are irredeemably provincial. (What
do you call someone who speaks two
languages? Bilingual. What do you call
someone who speaks one language?
American.) And it is perfectly true that,
while lawyers in many countries are
likely to have had some instruction in a
foreign law (and even to have studied in
a foreign country—often the United
States), American lawyers have generally
not been so blessed. To be sure, Ameri-
cans lawyers have less need. They work
in the world’s dominant economic
power, one so vast that much more in-
ternal trade occurs within American
boundaries than within any other in-
dustrialized country. American lawyers,
to put the point differently, are more
narrowly trained because—more than
the lawyers in other countries—they
can afford to be.
Foreign observers also relish suggest-
ing that America has resisted signing
some international human rights
treaties because it is hopelessly arrogant
and cannot believe it has anything to
learn about human rights from abroad.
It is surely true that American foreign
policy has in recent decades often
seemed loftily confident of its mission
to bring the wretched heathen to the
human rights light. But the reluctance
to sign such treaties has other, less evi-
dent, roots as well. For one thing, a
number of international human rights
agreements have grown out of regional
(and particularly European) efforts at
economic and political integration, ef-
forts in which the United States has
been, if anything, a competitor. More
significantly, however, the government
of the United States is—more than al-
most any foreign country’s—federal.
We confide many issues with human
rights implications to the states, not the
federal government. In addition, some
Americans have opposed these treaties
because they take them seriously
enough to be uneasy about where judi-
cial interpretation will take their provi-
sions.
That the American executive and
legislative branches have not leapt to en-
dorse human rights treaties may help
explain why American judges have not
felt encouraged to be guided by the de-
veloping international law of human
rights that judges in many countries are
creating. But two other factors are prob-
ably even more significant. First, the
ethos of the American law stubbornly
retains its common law inspiration,
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while Europeans still find their inspira-
tion in civil law. This matters because
the attempt to evolve a body of interna-
tional human rights law—in practice if
not in necessity—seems more conso-
nant with the civil law than the com-
mon law.
The common law grew out of the
decisions of English judges in particular
cases, while the civil law looks to gener-
al principles of law embodied in codes
that are supposed to be systematic. The
common law approach as Americans
understand it is experimental, flexible,
and pragmatic; it is of this time and of
that place. It seeks to discover through
social experiment what programs and
practices in fact work for us here today.
That is why Brandeis’ description of the
states as laboratories of democracy still
appeals to us and why we still remember
that Holmes said that the life of the law
is not logic, it is experience.
Proponents of civil law, on the other
hand, with their allegiance to general
principle, are more readily charmed by
abstraction and broad assertions of
principle. This difference in attitude has
for some years been exemplified for me
by an exchange I had with one of my
German students. We had been dis-
cussing a nuisance case in which the
court had sided with a plaintiff who had
“come to the nuisance.” My student
protested that this violation of one of
the common law’s undoubted apho-
risms made the law “incoherent.” I sug-
gested that it nevertheless made for
good social policy. I could hardly have
distressed her more. The law, she assev-
erated, must above all be a set of coher-
ent principles. I was pleased to be able
to quote Goethe in my defense, which
in Germany usually ends discussions:
“Grau, theurer Freund, ist alle Theorie,
und Grün des Lebens Goldner Baum”
(Gray, dear friend, is all theory, and
green life’s golden tree). But she re-
mained unappeased and even horrified
at the common law’s betrayal of the idea
of legal integrity.
The civilians’ taste for grand theory,
their thirst for universal, timeless truths,
perhaps explains how so much of the
legal world can tolerate what to unre-
constructed common lawyers look sus-
piciously like natural law ideas embod-
ied in contemporary treaties and the ju-
dicial opinions of many countries in
human rights cases. When the common
lawyer hears the kinds of expressions
common in the defense of these treaties
and opinions, when, for instance, the
common lawyer is admonished to pro-
tect “human dignity,” Jeremy Bentham’s
jibe springs irrepressibly to mind—that
natural law is “nonsense on stilts.”
“Nonsense on stilts” rings true to
common lawyers because they believe,
again with Holmes, that general propo-
sitions do not decide concrete cases,
that vague expressions of vast principles
can be interpreted so variously that they
neither instruct nor constrain judges,
that natural law incorporates more
rhetoric than reason. Postmodernism,
structuralism, and their ilk appeal not at
all to American judges, but they know
vacuity when they see it. The “right of
individual self-determination” is no
doubt a fine thing, but what does it tell
you, for example, about how implacable
a duty of informed consent to impose
on doctors?
This leads me to what must in this
cramped space be our last reason Amer-
ican judges have not swarmed to join
their European—and even Common-
wealth—brethren in building a com-
mon law of human rights. The com-
mon law gives judges extraordinary lib-
erty to make law. But only in some
areas, and only subject to the untram-
meled review of legislatures. Ultimately,
as we understand the common law tra-
dition, it is democratic. How, we ask, is
it democratically decent to hand over
lawmaking power to unelected judges
guided not by policy electorally estab-
lished, not by their understanding of
their own people’s law and tradition,
but by what they and their upper mid-
dle class confreres from abroad think
true at the end of the twentieth century?
These questions about the role of
unelected judges in a democracy have
been honed to biting sharpness in the
United States by our constitutional his-
tory. Through the New Deal, that was a
history of judicial reaction. In recent
decades, the direction of judicial ac-
tivism has shifted, but in ways that have
provoked vehement and tumultuous
dissent, as the words “Roe v. Wade” suf-
fice to remind us. This (probably unan-
ticipated) response and the changes in
judicial personnel that the response has
helped inspire have made the Supreme
Court leery of expansive interpretations
even of our own Constitution, much
less of developing an international law
of human rights that might lead the
Court into who knows what thickets of
brambles and briars. The Court’s latest
encounter with human rights in a
bioethical context—the assisted suicide
cases—exemplifies just this caution. In
those cases the Court declined to articu-
late any broadly phrased right, post-
poned further decision until more em-
pirical evidence grows out of experi-
ence, and saluted the virtues of deci-
sions reached by state legislatures. The
United States thus seems fated to re-
main—as it has long been—both pat-
tern and problem.
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